In chapter 1, question 4 of “The Greater Catechism” (Works, vol. 1) Owen asks “How do you know them [the scriptures] to be the word of God?” He answers:

By the testimony of God’s Spirit working faith in my heart to close with that heavenly majesty, and clear divine truth, that shineth in them.

What is significant about this quote is that, in one brief sentence, he combines the objective ground of the “autopistic” (that is, self-authenticating) nature of scripture — the heavenly majesty and clear divine truth contained therein — with the subjective ground thereof — the testimony of God’s Spirit working faith in the heart. Owen does not see any disjunction between the two. Rather, he sees the objective ground as that which the Spirit subjectively authenticates and makes plain. This is useful when facing the claim of many modern theologians that the Reformed orthodox traded the subjective, Spiritual testimony regarding scripture for a cold, empirical, rational certainty regarding scripture based upon its source.

A second teaching of Owen which bears noting is the manner in which he reconciles the Son or Logos as the essential Word of God, with the scriptures as the spoken Word of God written. In chapter 5 of his Christologia, Owen had previously noted, when speaking of the divine attributes:

A mere external doctrinal revelation of the divine nature and properties, without any exemplification or real representation of them, was not sufficient unto the end of God in the manifestation of himself. This is done in the Scripture. But the whole Scripture is built on this foundation, or proceeds on this supposition — that there is a real representation of the divine nature unto us, which it declares and describes. (Works 1, 95)

Owen proceeds to argue many things concerning how Christ is the personal revelation of God, largely centered around his twofold identity as the essential image of God (which is him considered strictly as the second person of the Trinity) and the representative image of God to man in his incarnation.  Owen continues:

It may be said, that the Scripture itself is sufficient for this end of the declaration of God unto us, so that there is no need of any other representation of him; and [that] these things serve only to turn the minds of men from learning the mind and will of God therein, to seek for all in the person of Christ. But the true end of proposing these things is, to draw men unto the diligent study of the Scripture, wherein alone they are revealed and declared. And in its proper use, and unto its proper end, it is perfect and most sufficient. It is logos tou Theou — “the word of God;” howbeit it is not logos ousiodes, the internal, essential Word of God — but logos prophorikos, the external word spoken by him. It is not, therefore, nor can be, the image of God, either essential or representative; but is the revelation and declaration of it unto us, without which we can know nothing of it. (Works 1, 101)

This establishes that there is a twofold word of God: the Essential or personal, and the external, spoken or revealed; and that it is the purpose of the latter to bear witness to the former.  This allows us to sail carefully between the Schylla of the Neo-Orthodox and the Charybdis of those who hold revelation to consist solely of propositional truths.  Against the Neo-Orthodox, scripture is called Word, not *because* it bears witness thereunto (which, indeed, it also does), but because it is, in itself, the very word of God; and the scopus or fundamentum thereof is Christ in his person and office as mediator of the covenant.  Thus, scripture is the Word of God, not derivatively from Christ the essential Word, but it also cannot be separated from him who is the Personal revelation of God, who, in turn, cannot rightly be considered the Sum or totality of revelation as the logos ensarkos.

The influence of rationalist models is immediately seen in Venema’s work, in that he begins his work with a description of reason and its uses, referring to reason as  “a primary source of theology;” it is important to note, however, that he yet maintains that it is subordinate to revelation.

Though there is much of interest in Venema’s treatment of reason, our primary purpose in looking at his work will be found in his second chapter, on Religion.  For it is here that he considers reason in its actual use and its relationship to actual theology.  In the first he considered reason as to its essence; in the present chapter, he considers reason in its use by fallen and redeemed creatures.

After discussion religion in general, Venema begins (p.25) to show “how religion flows from reason as its source.”  To do so, he states that three things must be proved:

1. That God desires to be worshipped by his rational creatures.
2. That God must be worshipped and that we are bound to worship him.
3. That God must be rightly worshipped. (pp.25-26)

It must be observed that even in his consideration that “God must be rightly worshipped,” Venema still considers reason to be a source of this knowledge.

On p.27 begins the critical argument: “Reason, however, is of itself an insufficient source of Theology. 1st, Because fallen man cannot make the right use of it. 2d, Because even although he could do so, it cannot bring him to the knowledge of the only way of salvation,” as such knowledge contains truths above view of reason.  In explication of the first point he brings forth three causes, summarized below:

1. In man’s fallen condition, he is incapable of deducing even those basic truths of reason.  This arises not from a defect of reason itself, but through man’s corruption and inability to make right use thereof; not through a physical incapability, but through a fault entirely of their own making through the making of hasty and unsound judgments.
2. Those truths which it does teach, it yet “it lacks the clearness and convincing power to remove all doubt and suppress all anxiety.”
3. Man cannot conform himself to the dictates which reason prescribes.

These statements demonstrate an important point.  Whatever high view of reason a late theologian such as Venema espoused, his system yet is not one which lies upon a necessary foundation of natural theology as found in many of his contemporaries.  He does, however, betray his departure from an orthodox use of reason in statements such as the following:

What, then, it may be asked is the use of reason?  We answer, that it serves many important purposes.  It imparts to us the knowledge of God as the creator, the preserver, and the judge of the world.  It tells us what is true and false — what is morally good and evil–and furnishes various motives for the cultivation of virtue, and for the avoidance of vice.  It is useful in the management and defence of the interests of society, and directs man in framing laws, cultivating arts, and discharging duties which contribute to the public weal.  It prepares us for revelation, as the other source of religion, and shews us the necessity of it by convincing us of its own insufficiency for salvation, and of our utter hopelessness in this matter, unless a revelation be given.  It presupposes to a certain extent that a revelation will be given.  It goes farther; and, by arguments drawn from the goodness, long suffering, and mercy of God toward our race, proves that a revelation is not only possible and necessary, but probably, and that God would not have exercised his power in giving it, if it had not been his design thereby to lead us to the knowledge and attainment of salvation….It enables man, moreover, to distinguish between a revelation that is true and false, and assists him in understanding it” (pp.30-31).

Though there is much in the above (primarily in the first half) with which confessional orthodoxy would agree, there is yet much found in the second half which has gone too far.  Reason is not merely instrumental to theology here, but is another source or principia.  We see here, for instance, the unfortunate beginnings of the paidagogos, or “tutor unto Christ,” of Galatians 3 being transferred from the supernaturally revealed gospel of the Law to natural theology in a way foreign to the high orthodox formulations of Turretin, Du Moulin, Heidegger, Alsted, etc (see Muller, PRRD I, pp. 308-309)

The first half of Du Moulin’s treatment is centered upon that which may be known of God through natural revelation; and the author at times attributes a fair amount of knowledge more to natural philosophy than other Reformed theologians.  This is why it is of the utmost importance to note Du Moulin’s stated purpose for his description of the natural knowledge of God.  It is not to advocate the institution of a natural theology which is foundational to or prior to revealed theology.  Rather,

Before therefore we enter into the chancell of this temple [that is, the doctrine of God in scripture], it will be profitable awhile to stay in the Courts thereof, where  no little splendor doth appeare, and where God hath left no obscure representations of his power and his Wisedome: for so  will we ascend by method and degrees to the Doctrine of the Church, that it may appeare how much the Church doth differ  from the Lycaeum, how much the Schoole of Christ doth excell the Schooles of the Philosophers, how much the Revelation of God doth overcome the relation and Capacity of Man.  (6)

His express purpose in spending so much time detailing the natural knowledge of God is that the relative excellency of the Revealed knowledge might shine through all the brighter.  For as he had said immediately prior:

But againe, not every knowledge of God doth accomplish or illustrate the Vnderstanding; but only that which revealed by God himselfe is contained in his Word: For as we doe not behold the Sunne in the same manner as we doe other things, for other things are discerned by the light of the Sunne, but the Sunne illustrates himselfe unto us by his owne light; So God cannot bee knowne but by his proper Light, and unlesse he be pleased to infuse into our Soules the true knowledge of himselfe. (5)

He then begins his treatment of the natural knowledge of God (hereafter NKG) not with acquired knowledge through the study of nature, but with the inherent knowledge in man by creation — the chief witness being the universality of conscience in man, for which he cites the almost omnipresent reference of Caligula.   After this, he discusses the drive to further acquisition of knowledge through the study of nature which this inherent knowledge produces; whereof he distinguishes two sorts: that of the brutish and barbarous men (who are moved to the worship of the divine by the stars, and heavenly bodies, and seasons, etc.); and that of the philosophers, who have recognized the truth of God’s existence by way of efficient causes, number, whole and parts, etc.  Further, Du Moulin proceeds to note the many vestiges or images of God found in creation, whereby man can have certain knowledge of him: the chiefest among these is his most clear imprint of his image in man himself.  In partial summation of this, he writes the following:

By these staires, as it were, the mind of Man ascends to the knowledge of God, by this wing shee doth mount her selfe:

These are those backe-parts of the Almighty which it is permitted to Man to see, Exod. 33, to wit, the workes of God
which are knowen to us onely ex posteriori by the events and the effects: Or rather by this doth not the Scripture giue us
to understand, that God comming cannot be perceived, but after that hee hath passed by and strooke us, then we know
him? For wee are altogether ignorant what God will doe; but after the execution of the Act, then wee acknowledge his
power either by afflicting or delivering us. (30)

The above quote has an additional layer of importance.  Here, as elsewhere, Du Moulin confirms his teachings of the NKG with scripture.  This demonstrates how far he is from setting forth a system of natural religion, for the fact and boundaries of the NGK depend upon scripture’s authority.  It must first be asked whether scripture allows a NKG or a natural theology; only then can the topic be discussed.  This is quite the opposite of natural religion, wherein the validity of scripture would depend upon whether reason can grant it or no.  For a clear example of this in earlier Reformed thought, see the beginning of Daneau’s Physice Christiana.

It is important to note next that, after discussing these manners whereby men have, in fact, come to recognize the existence of the divine, Du Moulin states that it is not the role of teachers to demonstrate this existence to men who do not believe this which even the devils acknowledge (yea, he “deserves rather the executioner to torment him, than the Philosopher to instruct him” [31]); the fault is moral or ethical, not rational.  He states in the same paragraph that his intention in providing these arguments was not to argue the existence of God, but simply to demonstrate those means by which the heathens minds have upheld themselves throughout the ages.  This point is crucial to the traditional Reformed understanding of the role of rational argumentation for the existence of God.

He then notes that the existence of God is, nevertheless, not self-evident and proceeds to enumerate the types and causes of Atheism, noting that there are few which deny the existence of God, but many which deny his providence; and more which worship that which is not truly God.  Two of the chief causes attributed by Du Moulin are 1.) The vice and wickedness of man; and 2.) The incomprehensible nature of the essence of God, there being no proportion between the finite and the infinite.  This difficulty is able to be overcome, however, through the use of analogy.  Whereby the author proceeds (beginning in paragraph 46) to classify those attributes of God’s essence which can be known by nature.  In the service of this task, he largely employs the three standard means of the Reformed theologians: the way of causality, the way of negation and the way of eminence.  In the course of this discussion, he provides a standard treatment of the relationship of the attributes to the essence and one to another; and he also manifests slightly speculative tendencies, deducing at times one attribute from another (see paragraph 60).

This treatment being concluded, he resumes his overarching purpose by using the NKG to stir us up to desire all the more that which God has revealed in his Word.  Of this revelation, Du Moulin notes two parts: the Law and the Gospel, the latter being the most perfect wherein God is most fully revealed.  For in the former two ways of knowing God (by the creatures and the Law), God is only known absolutely; in the latter, however, he is know relatively, or as he is toward us — that is, as he is reconciled to us, and has adopted us as his children.  This last form of revelation alone is soteric, and apart from this all other knowledge would be empty speculation.

He then proceeds to discuss another facet of the necessity of God’s Word in the gospel: for, on account of the fall, we would be unfruitful in the NKG if left to ourselves.  The Word in the gospel, however, provides us with the necessary “corrective spectacles” wherewith we are made able to rightly understand natural revelation.  Thus he says of David, who had lamented when he saw in God’s governance that the ungodly lived with apparent blessing and the righteous in comtempt:

..which affliction of his mind was eased after hee was entred into the Sanctuary of God, from whence as from a Watch Tower, hebehld the end of the Vngodly, and acknowledged that the happinesse of men was not to be adjudged by the present condition of their state; but by the counsell of God, and the last event of things: the holy man owed this his rectifyed judgment of humane affaires to the Word of God, from which in many places hee confesseth, that hee had derived the wisdome of his knowledge. (71)

Therefore, the Word of the Gospel alone is able to correct our reason and allow us to rightly view God; and thus the Word alone is able to obliterate false religion and bring in the true worship of God.

The remainder of the treatise is filled, first, with various proofs that the scriptures in the Bible contain that true revelation of God.  Again, it is important to note that, in good Reformed fashion, he begins first with that chief witness of the Holy Spirit which testifies to his own that such is his word; only then does he begin to make us of a posteriori evidences to comfort and strengthen the godly, and to quite the unbeliever.  Secondly, he gives a brief summation of the doctrine of the Gospel itself, the revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ, which is the fullness of the knowledge of God.   Thirdly, he briefly argues as to the manner of Divinity, or how we make use of this word, of which faith in God and union with God are chief.  Fourthly, he discourses at length about the profit of the Word or the study of divinity and wherein it benefits man; and finally is a lengthy exhortation on account of what has gone before to the diligent study of the Word so that we might know God, walk rightly before him, walking in blessedness and communion with him.

Thus we see that the overall purpose of the treatise, though it is indeed at times highly philosophical and scholastic in nature, is overtly practical. It is an declaration of the glories of the true knowledge of God found in scripture, and an earnest exhortation to follow after this.  And secondly, it is a firm testimony that a work which makes heavy use of reason and philosophy is yet firmly grounded in scripture.  It is not a sign of Reformed orthodoxy moving toward rationalism, or betraying the Biblical fidelity or Sola Scriptura principle of the Reformers.

The word “nature” is attributed to God in Gal. 4:8, where Paul says, The Gentiles served those which by nature are not gods; whence is surmised the contrary — that the true God is god by nature; and thus, for instance, Peter is able to say that the faithful are partakers of the divine nature (2 Pet. 1:4).  Therefore God has a divine nature of which the faithful are partakers; and that this be rightly understood, the various significations of the word “nature” must be examined by us.

Nature is derived from nascendo, even as physis from phuein; but in the received use according to Aristotle’s Metaphysics (book 4, ch. 4), the term has three significations.  The first signifies generation or nativity itself.  In this sense all are said to be by nature children of wrath (Eph. 2:3), and in this respect the word nature cannot be attributed except to the Son of God alone, who is the proper and only begotten Son of God (John 1:14, 3:16).  Secondly, the term signifies the very essence of a thing, even as we say that there are two nature in Christ (i.e., essences), namely the divine and human; and thus we use Galatians 4:8 of God, in the place cited above.  Thirdly, it signifies the essential and proper properties of a thing, in which sense it is used of God in 2 Pet. 1:4.  For the faithful are partakers, not of the of the essence, but of the divine properties by regeneration, of which this place speaks.

In this matter which is now undertaken by us, we use the word nature in the second and third sense alone; namely, for the very essence of God (common to all three persons), and for the essential and common properties or attributes; which attributes are are either communicable or incommunicable to creatures; by all of which God is thus able to be described:

God is an essence eternal, most simple, immutable, infinite, living, most wise and omnipotent, having in himself every perfection, which are found in the creatures by way of eminence, and without any imperfection, and therefore most perfect and blessed.

After establishing this, Musculus describes the Eight Degrees “through which we must mass before come unto it.”

1. “We must be emptied of that impiety found in those which say in their hearts, “There is no God.”

2. We must know who is the true God (the creator of Heaven and earth), lest we worship another.

3. We must know what it is to be the true God.  He draws the example of a physician: though we know the face of our physician, nevertheless if we do not know what it means for him to be a physician, we can never cleave to him and his directions as we ought.

4. We must know that “he only is the one true God, one in essence and three in person.”

5. We must know the nature of God, as expressed in his names and attributes.

6. We must know that he is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that he has sent him to the world for the salvation of man as mediator and redeemer; and that he has adopted as sons all such as believe on him.

7. We must not only know generally all that has been so said thus far (i.e., the bare fact), but we must also know personally that he is God and Father particularly to us, and that in Christ he is loving, merciful and kind to us.

8. Lastly, all of the above is only effectual if we do “serve, obey and love him who we acknowledge to be the only and true God,” and prize him above all things in Heaven and earth.

Thus we see that knowledge cannot be separated from its soteric function; true knowledge of God is the “enjoying of him forever” as our God, our Father in Christ.  The impact which this has on the goals and methods of theological system should be readily apparent.

Have a nice day!

Until then, I think the following must be said regarding this work of Bullinger’s: it may be too easy to overestimate the importance of this work when attempting to systematize Bullinger’s theology and discern controlling motifs from which his topics are synthetically deduced; for, while the idea of Covenant was most certainly important as a potential organizational tool at Bullinger’s disposal (see chiefly his Compendium and Catechesis pro adultioribus), the conspicuous absence of the concept must be noted in his two most comprehensive works (The Decades and The Second Helvetic Confession – although it should be noted that Koch considers the covenant to be the implicit organizational structure of the latter, though it is only explicitly mentioned in the topic of baptism). I put forth the following reasons for limiting the role of De testamento as a primary work for advocating a divergent covenant tradition started by Bullinger:

1.) The highly noticeable absence in this work of themes otherwise central to Bullinger’s theology should not be ignored. Justification by faith is mentioned only once in this work, and that as almost no more than a passing aside; though, indeed, Bullinger brings in discussions of predestination proper much less than the other Reformed theologians of his age, the concept of a soteriological monergism is nevertheless found all over his works: it is, however, not discussed in this work, as with other concepts which Bullinger normally discusses at great length.

2.) Nor can the polemical context of this treatise be overlooked: there was perhaps no other concept than the unity of the Covenant, along with its terms, conditions and promises which is better suited or more necessary to counter the teachings of the Anabaptists of Bullinger’s day. It is perfectly natural that, given these conditions, this concept will be exalted to a peculiar place of prominence, as opposed to other doctrines concerning which it was not necessary to argue.

3.) His commentaries — principally those on Romans, Hebrew, 1 Peter and Galatians — should not be ignored. Several passages from these commentaries use nearly identical wording to parallel topics in De testamento (in particular, Hebrews 8, Romans 9 and 1 Peter 2), in which the bilateral covenant concept of De testamento is balanced to more typical formulations of the time.

None of these points are to suggest that Bullinger’s development of the covenant concept and its role in the theological system was not of the utmost importance — indeed, it surely was, and his formulations thereof were quite influential on the Reformed tradition. It is, however, misguided to attempt to use this work as a key piece of argumentation that Bullinger was responsible for authoring a divergent covenant tradition, when many factors suggest that the less-common elements of this work do not present the author attempting a strictly “atemporal dogmatic” treatment of the covenant, but the use of key elements of the concept to refute a specific set of errors.  In other words, we ought to employ the basic standards of interpretation and not attempt to fit all the writings of an author into a framework erected by one or two smaller works; rather, we ought to (indeed) take these smaller works into consideration, and perhaps acknowledge the need to interpret these in light of more full and elaborate treatments of Bullinger’s theology.  The question will remain in further exploration of Bullinger’s other works whether he does present a more balanced view (Plot Spoiler: He probably does).

PostScript

Please bear with me as I work through the formatting of these posts. I am currently using an obviously “popular” style of writing, and am refraining from an academic, citation-ridden format. In subsequent posts I will be trying to strike a balance between the two.

Whosoever then would contend boldly with the ungodly must first have to do with God, and confirm and ratify as it were the compact which God has proposed to us, even that we are his people, and that he in his turn will be always our God. (Commantary on Habakkuk 1:12)

This in no way undermines or weakens the soteriological monergism of Calvin’s teaching (any more than in Bullinger’s!), as this requirement in man is itself a gracious donation from God (a unilateral grant), as the following demonstrate from his sermon on Dt. 32:46.

True it is that we can neither keep God’s word nor do it until he have written it on our hearts. But Moses presupposeth that God will shed out his Holy Spirit upon the people.

And again,

So then let us not think as the papist does that Moses upholdeth here the Freewill of men, or purpose, therewithall to set forth their deservings, as though men could by their own power and policy obtain paradise, and were able to serve God and to do the commandments of the Law: Moses went not that way to work: but he knew what promise had been made to the people, and that all things tended to the Covenant which God had made with them…where it is said that God would make a new Covenant with his people, which was that he would write his Law in their hearts and change their stony hearts into hearts of flesh.

These two concepts can exist alongside one another without conflict in Calvin.

The first few posts will deal with De testamento seu foedere dei unico & aeterno. This work has the distinction, according to Gottlob Schrenk, of being the first work in history to use the concept of covenant as a “constitutive dogmatic principle” (see Dowey, Edward Heinrich Bullinger as a Theologian, in Architect of the Reformation, ed. Gordon and Campini). This work has recently been translated by Charles McCoy and J. Wayne Baker and is appended to their book, The Fountainhead of Federalism. While I would encourage you to check this book out from the library to read their translation, it must be noted that one of the goals of this blog will be to demonstrate the invalidity of Baker’s main thesis concerning Bullinger and his role in authoring the “other reformed tradition;” and I hope to help demonstrate that Bullinger’s theology is both compatible with and highly influential to the main reformed tradition having its roots in the teachings of Calvin, Vermigli, Bucer and many others.

This initial post will do little more than provide a brief overview of this work; subsequent entries will examine specific aspects of Bullinger’s short treatise in greater detail.

J. Wayne Baker, in a short essay, has done a reasonable job of providing a background to the publication of this work: Church, State, and Dissent: The Crisis of the Swiss Reformation, 1531-1536 (Church History, 57.2). The overall theme of the treatise is to provide a foundation for the present use of Old Testament teaching and principles which are not found in the New Testament; this was directly necessary for refuting the dangers Bullinger saw in Anabaptist teaching, many of whom rejected the Old Testament as carnal, whereas the New was spiritual. Thus, they held that affairs of civil government, which pertained to the carnal man, did not apply to those in the New Covenant; nor did the Law of Moses; and further, that the church was restricted to Spiritual men, and accordingly baptism was not to be administered to children. Bullinger consequently had the task of proving that, while the Old Testament verily included many carnal ordinances, these served a spiritual purpose; and that the Testament itself, while often presented under carnal form, was spiritual and that the people with whom it was struck were a spiritual people. Only by first establishing this (that the Covenant was one and everlasting) would Bullinger be in position to argue that the present church-state, along with the Old, was spiritual and yet had an earthly administration involving physical laws and civil rulers.

This is not to say that this treatise is limited to this purpose: it in fact contains one of the most brilliant and succinct introductory distillations of Christian teaching from the early period of the Reformation. It demonstrates to the faithful the unity of God’s purpose and presents an overall context in which to understand scripture. These themes will be elaborated upon in subsequent posts.

To begin, below is a brief outline I have constructed of the treatise which we will expand and explore in detail.

1. Introduction

   1. Definition of the terms

      1. Testamentum

      2. Foedus

         1. The parts of a human covenant.

   2. God in condescension to man has expressed himself by way of and in the form of earthly covenants.

   3. The Covenant is expressed in Genesis 17:1-14, and includes the following elements:

      1. Who is bound: God and the Descendants of Abraham.

      2. The Conditions and Terms of the Covenant.

      3. The Duration of the Covenant: It is One and Everlasting.

      4. The Confirmatory Seal of the Covenant

      5. The Records of the Covenant

2. The Parties

   1. God. Our religion is founded upon God’s gracious entrance into this Covenant.

   2. The Descendants of Abraham.

      1. The “Children of Abraham” are not the physical descendants, but the faithful.

      2. However, children of the faithful are most certainly included in the covenant; no child, however, can claim a right to the blessings of the covenant purely by physical descent.

      3. Contra the Anabaptists, the first mention of the “Spiritual People of God” is not in the NT. Compare Jer. 4 and Romans 2; or the prophets with John 8 or Gal. And Rom.

      4. Thus, NT statements about the seed being the faithful is not said in exclusion of infants, rather it is said in exclusion of hypocrites and those who trusted in physical descent and outward ceremony.

3. The Conditions

   1. The Promises of God

      1. Summarized in his name: El Shaddai (The All-sufficient God)

      2. The Promise is chiefly spiritual, consisting in the grant of himself.

         1. It was often presented under the form of earthly goods.

         2. Nevertheless, behind these earthly goods the faithful sought the true substance.

   2. The Conditions for Man

      1. “You will keep my covenant, you and your descendants in their generations. Walk before me and be upright.”

      2. The summation of the requirements for men are:

         1. Faith

         2. Love toward God and neighbor

   3. Excursus: Thus, these conditions and terms of the covenant contain the substance of all things found in scripture; and thus is it said that the covenant is the scope of scripture.

      1. The Moral law (or Decalogue) is but an expansion of the Covenant terms.

      2. The Judicial laws express certain principles of walking uprightly in the covenant as pertains to human dealings; Abraham lived according to these principles; Moses delivered them to the people; and societies today ought to live in accord with them. The magistrate is a vital minister of God.

      3. The prophets show us the terms of the covenant in action.

      4. Christ, as recorded in the gospels:

         1. By the very fact of his incarnation, death and resurrection confirms the promises and sufficiency of God.

         2. He also prescribes the conditions for men, both:

            1. By his actions;

            2. By his teaching.

      5. The apostles also teach who are the heirs of Abraham, etc.

4. The Unity or Duration of the Covenant: It is One and Everlasting

   1. Throughout the Old and New Testaments, scripture refers us back constantly to Abraham as the paradigm of our salvation.

   2. The accidents of the Covenant have differed in time, and in this respect we may refer to the Old and the New.

   3. The reason for the Law at Sinai

      1. The requirements expanded into a list by the finger of God in the form of the 10 Commandments.

      2. The ceremonies afterwards added to keep men from idolatry and to show forth Christ.

   4. The benefits of the present Church-state.

   5. Several Objections dealt with:

      1. Matthew 5

      2. 2 Cor. 3

      3. Accusation of the Ebionite Heresy

      4. Deut. 5

      5. That the Old Covenant was based upon promises of earthly glory and the Land of Canaan; whereas the New Covenant says we shall suffer.

5. The Seal of the Covenant

   1. Circumcision was instituted to consecrate his Covenant.

      1. He who despises the sign despises also the Covenant.

      2. But he who does not contemn the ordinance, but rather is prevented should not thus be thought cast off from God’s people.

   2. With the confirmation of the Covenant by Christ’s death, the confirmatory sign also changes.

      1. Baptism

      2. The Eucharist

6. The Records of the Covenant

   1. They were published continually over time in the books of the Old and New Testament.

   2. As with earthly testaments, any disputes or questions over the inheritance and conditions is to be resolved in these documents.

7. Epilogue: The Antiquity of this Reformed Faith

   1. The worship bound to this Covenant far precedes heathen religions, and those of the Muslims and Papists.

   2. Continuing in the terms of the Covenant, God will continue to establish the true religion.